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  It is generally believed that successful economic and political transitions, and even 
development more broadly requires the development of a significant and stable middle class.  
This middle class is defined in both economic terms, meaning a relatively flat income 
distribution, and in political terms, meaning a bloc of centrist voters.  This paper examines 
measures of income shares and growth, political attitudes and voting in Poland and Russia during 
the 1990’s to test the proposition that the growth of an entrepreneurial based sector of new 
enterprises is an important factor in the growth of an economic and a political middle class. The 
evidence is in both countries regions with a larger de novo economic sector have increased the 
income share going to the bottom two quintiles,  have higher income growth rates, and have given 
more political support to centrist liberal parties.  We also show that individuals employed in these 
new firms and/or living in these successful regions are more likely to have economically and 
politically liberal attitudes.  We conclude by suggesting that de novo firm creation is an important 
factor in successful and stable transitions. 
JEL Codes: D3, O87, P2 
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 The Evolution of an Economic and Political Middle Class in Transition Countries 
 We think a fair description of the end state envisioned by most reformers in the former 
Socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe was a society that closely resembled those in 
Western Europe, North American and parts of Asia.  Key features of these countries, broadly 
defined, is a capitalist based market economy and a liberal democracy with a significant 
economic, social and political middle class.  To say that success in reaching that goal is mixed is 
a clear understatement.  One simple way of seeing the different levels of success is through the 
changes in the income distributions in the transitional countries.  Table 1 shows the gini 
coefficients describing the pre-transition and current income distributions in some of these 
countries and the distributions in a set of traditional developed market democracies.   
(Table 1 About Here.) 
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe have quite modest increases in inequality, 
averaging about +0.05, and now quite closely correspond to the OECD mean of about 0.31.  
These are also the countries generally seen as having relatively successful transitions by a number 
of criteria. The countries from the former Soviet Union, by contrast, experienced substantial 
increases in inequality, averaging a whopping +0.17 increase in the average gini.  Russia, which 
underwent extensive privatization, had a +0.20 increase in its gini coefficient and a level in 2001 
well above the OECD mean.  Estonia, which is one of the most successful of the former CIS 
states, had an increase in inequality that slightly exceeded that of the CEE states. Both Belarus 
and Ukraine, which did little reform and whose economies have been extremely hard hit have 
little or modest increases in inequality, showing that lack of any reform has little impact on 
inequality. 
There are other ways to measure the success, or lack of, in these transitions, such as income 
growth, life expectancy, electoral competition, etc. But, an equitable income distribution that is 
conducive to the formation a powerful middle class is, in our view, critical because it enables 
institutions that are critical for market economies, such as independent courts and voting that 
reflects the preferences of a broad spectrum of the populace. For example, when there is a 
massive income inequality, the very rich substratum can easily subvert courts by bribing and 
threatening judges and bailiffs (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 2003). Similar arguments can 
be made about the ability of the very rich to subvert fair voting and the emergence of political 
competition. We will examine several other measures in addition to the changes in income 
distribution just described.  There are many factors that correlate with these measures of 
performance and there is no single factor that predicts the presence of absence of a successful 
transition.  But, we want to explore one aspect of the transition we believe consistently correlates 
with all these measures of success.  This is the ability of the economy to generate new firms to 
replace the old state firms. This replacement process is critical whether or not the state firms are 
privatized.   
In this paper we examine a number of these associations among regions in Poland and Russia.  
These two countries offer two stark contrasts in the path and success of the transition. Our 
strategy is that if these associations are evident in these two contrasting settings it will lend 
credibility to our basic argument.  These two countries provide an important context for this 
analysis as each has enough regions with very heterogeneous experiences to support comparative 
statistical analysis.  In the first section we argue about why the rate of new firm entry and growth 
is likely to be related to the expansion and well-being of an economic and political middle class.  
This section is followed by a discussion of the data and methods used to examine these 
relationships.  Then we present the findings and conclude with a discussion of the implication for 
successful transitions.   
1.  New Firm Entry and Changes in Economic and Political Structures 
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The classic argument making the creation of new firms the key to economic growth is Joseph 
Schumpeter’s (1934) description of creative destruction.  In this model, innovation and adaptation 
are done much better by new firms than by old firms.  This view of firm replacement as the 
central feature of economic expansion is also seen in the work by various Sociologists (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977 and 1989; Carroll, 1984 and reviews by Amburgey and Hayagreeva, 1996; 
Carroll, 1988; Singh, 1990; and Singh and Lumsden, 1990).  In both the economic and 
sociological models replacement is the key to growth and to the ability for economies to adapt to 
radically changing environments.  Consistent with this view of development de novo enterprises 
are virtually the sole source of job creation in the transitional economies, offsetting the layoffs 
produced by hard budget constraints, privatization and restructuring among the state and former 
state firms.  (See Bilsen and Konings, 1998, for evidence from Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary; 
Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2005 for evidence from Poland; and Jurajda and Terrell, 2001, for 
evidence from the Czech Republic and Estonia.  Kornai, 2000, offers a similar description of 
Hungary, but no data are available to support the observation.)    
The growth of this de novo sector stimulates the growth of the economy and of the middle 
class in a number of ways.  Most obviously, these new firms provide employment for those who 
might otherwise be unemployed as a consequence of the restructuring of the former state sector.  
These jobs stimulate the aggregate economy and as they are likely to provide more income than 
unemployment benefits the wages earned will boost the earnings at the lower end of the income 
distribution.   
Less directly, new firms contribute to a higher and a more equitable income distribution 
through their contribution to aggregate productivity.  There is empirical evidence that these new 
firms have higher productivity than the firms they are replacing, following the Schumpeterian 
idea of creative destruction.  DeLoecker and Konings (2005) develop a comparison of new and 
old manufacturing firms in Slovenia based on estimates of total factor productivity.  They 
conclude that, “…the net entry of de novo private firms is an important component explaining 
growth in total factor productivity.”   Jackson, Klich and Poznańska (2005), using longitudinal 
data on cohorts of new and old enterprises, find several relationships that are consistent with the 
DeLoecker and Konings results.  They do not have measures of total factor productivity but 
examine sales per worker as a substitute.  They find that within cohorts of new firms both 
survival and growth are strongly related to average sales per worker, indicating that over time the 
most productive firms are employing a larger share of the workforce.  They also show that the 
wage growth among surviving firms in a cohort is strongly related to sales per worker and to the 
firms’ sales growth.  Lastly, their analysis indicates that wage growth is more closely tied to 
productivity growth in the surviving de novo firms than it is among the state and former state 
owned firms.  In the short-run it is impossible to say how this Darwinian process will affect 
regional incomes as that will be a function of the aggregate demand for and supply of labor, 
which will be related to more factors than just the number and growth of new firms, such as the 
unemployment rate.  (For discussions of how wages might relate to unemployment see Jackson, 
2003 and Tichit, 2003.)  In the longer run, however, with a competitive labor market the 
equilibrium wage will reflect this higher level of productivity among the surviving new firms.   
 A high rate of entry and survival of new firms increases the competitiveness of product and 
labor markets, eventually eliminating the monopoly rents that accrue in concentrated markets 
(McMillan, 1995).  Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) argue that in the first years of 
transition small start-up firms in Poland and Russia (and in many other post-socialist economies) 
entered sectors, such as consumer goods, light manufacturing, trade and services that had been 
dominated by large state enterprises under socialism. The inefficiencies of the state enterprises in 
these sectors created tremendous profit opportunities for initial entrants. Over time, the continued 
entry of these firms reduced these profits.  Johnson, et. al. (2002) show that in Poland by 1995 
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these rents fell as competition increased.   This was not so true in Russia, however, as the slow 
development of market supporting institutions and lower rates of firm entry led to the persistence 
of initially high profit rates (see McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). Also, Frye and Shleifer (1997) 
present evidence that in 1996 small firms in Warsaw were operating in a more competitive 
market than their counterparts in Moscow.   The de novo sector then provides employment 
through its job creation, is likely to produce higher wages in the long run due to the high 
productivity, and reduces monopoly rents because of the increased competition in a broad range 
of industries.   
The economic competition created by the de novo sector increases the likelihood of a 
political middle class that will support centrist, and liberal, parties.  The early political economy 
of transition literature predicted that the unemployed and those in restructuring firms threatened 
with unemployment would join parties of either the right or the left that promised to slow or halt 
the reforms or at least to continue the soft budget constraints enjoyed by the large enterprises.  
(See Elster, 1993; Chan, 1995; Nelson, 1993; and citations in Hellman, 1998, fn. 2.)  The specter 
of this constituency was joined by the predictions of the creation of an oligarchic elite based on 
the rents accruing to the new monopolies resulting from large scale privatization.  These oligarchs 
would then use their positions and resources to capture the government and restrict the entry of 
domestic or foreign enterprises that would reduce their rents.  The owners and often the workers 
in the de novo sector, however, have no desire to support parties that either want to continue soft 
budget constraints or that want to protect the large monopolies.  Those in the de novo sector have 
an interest in continuing to deregulate the economy and to increase competition in sectors on 
which they depend for resources, such as materials, financing, labor, etc.1   
Our contention is that the faster the emergence of this de novo sector and the larger and more 
robust it is the faster will be the emergence of a prominent economic and political middle class 
and the greater the economic growth in the transitional countries.  The remainder of the paper 
relates several measures of the size and characteristics of this middle class to the size and growth 
of this de novo sector.  Much of the evidence we present is not new to this paper, but it has not 
been pulled together to make a broader assessment of the connections just outlined.   
2. Assessing the Economic and Political Middle Class 
As the preceding discussion suggested we examine several measures of well being and the 
growth of a middle class.  The regions in Russia and Poland are the focus or our attention.  
Unfortunately the data are not particularly comparable between the two countries, which 
necessitates some compromises on our part and weakens the ability to make direct comparisons.  
Nonetheless, the patterns we observe with the available data from the two countries tell a 
consistent story.  We begin by describing our measures of income growth and distribution in 
Poland and then Russia.   
Measuring Income Growth and Distribution and New Firm Creation  
The data and methods used to estimate the changes in regional income and shares going to 
the lowest quintiles are described in detail in Berkowitz and Jackson (2005) and are only 
summarized here.  Estimates of regional income distributions and of the size of the de novo sector 
in Poland come from specialized data collections.  The Polish Central Statistical Office does not 
                                                     
1 We do not want to sound naïve about what the owners in these emerging markets would like, as 
they would like subsidies and protection as much as any oligarch, it is just that they are not in a 
position to achieve these goals, so they are more likely to support the liberal parties.  Likewise, 
their employees would prefer the protections and wages offered by state unions, but again they 
are not in a position to achieve these ends.   
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disseminate publicly data on the regional distribution of income, necessitating a second best 
strategy. The Institute for Social Studies at the University of Warsaw has conducted the Polish 
General Polish Social Survey since 1992 (Cichomski and Morawski. 2002). This survey 
interviewed a nationally representative random sample of about 1600 households in 1992, 1993, 
and 1994 and of about 2300 households in 1997 and in1999.2  One of the questions asked for total 
monthly family income.  The 1992, 1993 and 1994 samples are pooled and family incomes in 
1993 and 1994 adjusted to 1992 price levels using the consumer price index. This set of 
respondents is referred to as the 1993 sample.  Similarly the 1997 and 1999 surveys are pooled 
and 1999 incomes adjusted to 1997 levels.  This sample is referred to as the 1998 sample.  Each is 
disaggregated by region (voivodship), of which there are forty-nine. Measures of income level 
and distribution are computed for each region based on the respondents residing in that region. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the means and ranges among voivodships.  (The 
Warsaw region is omitted from these statistics for reasons we discuss subsequently.)  The average 
and median growth in family incomes between 1993 and 1998, adjusted for changes in the CPI, 
are about thirty-five percent.  There is also a considerable range with the worst off region having 
a decline of thirteen percent and the best off region increasing by ninety-five percent.  Income 
distribution shows a modest improvement during this period as well.  The income share of both 
the first and second quintile increases by two-tenths of a percent during the 1993 to 1998 period. 
The standard deviation of the change in income shares at the regional level indicates there is 
considerable heterogeneity among regions, which is also shown by the difference between the 
minimum and maximum changes.  The former is a negative ten percent while the largest is a 
growth of twelve percent.  The correlation between regional shares in 1993 and in 1998, which is 
-0.2, further underscores the substantial regional variations.  The question we explore with the 
Polish data is whether these variations in income growth and shares are related to the size and 
growth of the de novo sector.   
(Table 2 About Here.) 
Measuring the size and growth of the de novo sector in transitional economies is a daunting 
task.  In Poland, however, we have access to a unique dataset developed by the Economics and 
Statistics Research Office of the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS).  They created 
longitudinal data tracking individual firms from annual reports filed by individual enterprises that 
measure the entry, survival and growth of new firms for the period 1990 through 1997.  (See 
Jackson, Klich, and Poznańska, 1999 and 2005.)  The firms' filings are linked to follow the 
survival and employment growth of small firms that existed in 1990 and the entry, survival and 
growth of new firms that entered after 1990.  From these data we calculate the number of firms in 
each region in 1997 that were small in 1990 or had entered since then and their total employment.  
These counts of employment and firms are denominated by the size of the workforce and by 
population, respectively. These firms’ employment share in 1997 and the change in their 
employment share from 1993 to 1997 are our measures of the size of the de novo economic sector 
in each region.  The bottom part of Table 2 shows the summary statistics for these variables.   
The effort to develop comparable data for Russia draws upon official Russian sources 
summarizing income distribution and small enterprise formation. We use published regional data 
supplied by the official Russian statistical agency (Goskomstat Rossii, 1996, 2001, 2002). These 
contain representative regional surveys of household income, regional registries of small 
enterprises, and data on the number of employees and sales in these new enterprises. Regional 
income distribution is reported in 1995, 2000 and 2001 and the methodology does not change 
                                                     
2 There is also a 1995 study that is not included in our analysis. 
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over time. Russia contains 89 regions; the 1995 national survey covers 75 of the regions, and the 
2001 survey covers 77. We match data from the national sample with our regional data set, which 
includes early privatization data and other regional covariates, and obtain a sub-sample of 67 
regions in 1995 and 2001 (Moscow is excluded for reasons we discuss in the next section).  Data 
on average per capita household income, which we use to measure regional incomes, goes back to 
1993.  All subsequent per capita household income measures are deflated in terms of 1993 so that 
a real growth figure can be computed. 
Table 2 reports the changes in regional income and the share of income held by the bottom 
forty percent of the regional income distribution.  The data on income growth (actually decline) 
are from Berkowitz and DeJong (2005) and cover the period 1993 to 2000.  The data on the 
changes in income distribution are from Berkowitz and Jackson (2005) and are for 1995 to 2001. 
The devastating effects of the 1998 crash are evident in the data on income changes as average 
regional income fell by about seven percent and declined in all regions except Moscow.3  In terms 
of income distribution, between 1995 and 2001 income distribution within Russian regions 
becomes slightly more inequitable.  Households in the bottom 40-percent of the income 
distribution on average lost 1-percentage point of their share of overall income.  There is less 
variation in income shares within Russia than within Poland. For example, the correlation 
between 1995 and 2001 income shares is 0.45 for the first and second quintiles combined. And, 
the range across regions is relatively smaller, from -6.5% to 5.2% for the first and second 
quintiles. Nevertheless, there is more than enough variation across the regions over time for us to 
be able identify reasons for the change in distributions. Finally, it is also clear that income 
distribution is more inequitable in Russia: during 1993 and 1998, the bottom 40-percent in Poland 
receives roughly 21.7% of the income, while in Russia, during 1995 and 2001, this group receives 
19.6%.  
For Russia we use small enterprise employment as a share of the regional workforce as 
measures of new and small enterprise development. These legally registered small enterprises 
include spin-offs from state enterprise and start-ups as well as privatized small former state 
enterprises. Before 1996, these small enterprises were defined by employment ceilings: over the 
course of a year on average a small enterprise could hire no more than 200 workers; and 
employment ceilings varied across branches, for example, the ceiling was 100 in scientific 
services and 15 in retail trade. However, as of 1996, small enterprises are defined by both 
ownership structure and employment. Regarding ownership, any enterprise, no matter how small, 
is not legally defined as small if it has an outside owner (a large company, a charitable 
organization, social organization or religious organization) that owns at least 25% of the initial 
enterprise capital. And, regarding employment ceilings, these have also changed and generally 
become smaller, for example, the highest ceiling is now 100 and applies to industry, construction 
and transport; and, the retail trade ceiling is elevated to 30 employees on average per year. 
Because the definition of a Russian and Polish small enterprise is very different, our small 
enterprise data cannot be used to compare small enterprise levels in these two countries.   
Table 2 reports data on the evolution of small enterprises for pairs of years in which the 
definitions are comparable and for which data are available. Remarkably, the number of small 
enterprises per capita and the share of the labor force employed in small enterprises decreases 
over time. There is an increase in employment shares in only two regions in our sub-sample, 
Nizhni Novgorod and St. Petersburg.  Thus, even though we are using somewhat different 
                                                     
3 We also examine regional income growth for 1993 to 1997, where the average growth is 1.3% 
with a range of -8.2% to +10.8%, again excluding Moscow where it increased by over 18%. 
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definitions of start-up and de novo activity, it is clear that small enterprise development is much 
more dynamic over time in Poland than in Russia. 
3. New Firm Creation and the Economic Middle Class 
For the social transition to succeed it is vital that standard of livings, which we measure 
by regional and personal income, increase and that this income is shared equitably. This section 
discusses estimation of the influence of small enterprise development on income growth and 
distribution in Poland and Russia.   Our analysis begins with the following equation: 
ΔYt = α + βSMENT + δX + ρYt−1 + εt ,                                         (1) 
where ΔYt and Yt-1, denote either the change in income or the income share going to the lowest 
two quintiles and its lagged value respectively.  SMENT is a measure of small enterprise 
development.  Its primary measure is the employment share of this sector in 1997 in Poland and 
in 2001 in Russia.  SMENT is also measured by the number of de novo private firms denominated 
by population divided by one hundred and then by the change in de novo private employment 
share from 1993 to 1997 for Poland and for 1995 to 2001 for Russia.  Our interest is in the size of   
β as it indicates by how much we expect income levels and its distribution to improve as regions 
increase their rates of growth of new firms. X is a vector of regional covariates.  These are 
education and log of population in the income distribution equations.  The income growth 
equation for Poland also includes both education and the log of population and for Russia it 
includes log of population and initial industrialization.   
Estimation Strategy 
Estimation of eq. 1 is complicated by the possibility of reverse causality.  The likelihood 
that increases in income stimulate new business formation is obvious.  As for income distribution, 
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) show through formal models that 
the entry of new firms in markets characterized by monopolistic competition is related to the 
distribution of income.  There is also a set of empirical studies arguing that more equitable 
income distributions are associated with higher rates of economic growth.  For a summary of this 
research see Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999) and Forbes (2000) for a contrary view.  
Keane and Prassad (2002) report a strong negative correlation between growth and inequality for 
fourteen transition countries over the first eight years of the transition.  If growth in these 
countries is strongly related to the growth of the de novo sector, as we believe it is, then our 
measures of small enterprise development will be endogenous in eq. 1.   
To overcome the estimation problems created by this endogeneity we develop a set of 
instruments for SMENT that should provide consistent estimates for the relationship between new 
enterprise development and changes in income equality.  We use early privatization and initial 
conditions as our instruments.  Because of differences in data availability and in their approaches 
to reforms the precise variables differ in each country.  For Russia the two instruments are the 
large and small scale privatizations, defined as the number of privatized firms in each category 
per 1000 population (source: Goskomstat, 1994).4.  In Poland only data on large scale 
privatization, defined as the proportion of the 1993 workforce employed in firms privatized to 
that point, is available.  Additional relevant initial condition variables are the proportion of the 
                                                     
4 The regional privatization combined voucher and cash privatization of large and medium sized 
companies. In an effort to avoid problems associated with over-identification, we do not include 
early regional privatization. 
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1990 non-farm workforce employed in state-owned enterprises and the proportion of the 
workforce employed in private enterprises with fewer than one hundred employees.5   
The first requirement for our instruments is that they be directly related to the size of the de 
novo enterprise sector.  This assumption is inspired by McMillan (1995), who argues that early 
privatization affects the emergence of a regulatory environment that enhances the entry and 
development of small enterprises. It is expected that privatization, if done properly, weakens the 
political connections of the controllers of formerly state owned enterprises.  In this case 
governments, both national and local, would not have an incentive to use their tax and regulatory 
policy to protect state owned enterprises against entering small enterprises.  Further, governments 
can expand their tax base and enhance the standard of living by developing a pro-small business 
regulatory environment.  If privatization fails to eliminate these political connections then we 
have the same conditions that exist with a large concentration of state enterprises where 
governments will have an incentive to protect the large enterprises.  Berkowitz and Holland 
(2001) find strong positive relationships between new firm registrations and federal and regional 
privatization in Russia, but small negative relationships for local privatization.   
The greater the degree of capture of government agencies by the privatized firms and the 
smaller the separation of these firms from the government the weaker should be the relationship 
between privatization and new firm entry.  Poland and Russia have quite different privatization 
experiences.  Poland proceeded very slowly with large scale privatization while Russia privatized 
very rapidly.  Several papers argue that early Russian privatization led to a corrupt regulatory 
environment that persisted through at least the mid 1990s while early Polish privatization had the 
opposite effect.  (See Alexeev, 1999; Berkowitz and Li, 2000; Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 
2000; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Hellman, 1998; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993.)  A number of 
estimates of corruption indicate far less corruption in Poland than in Russia (Johnson, et. al., 
2002; Hellman, Jones and Kaufman, 2000; Karatnycky, et. al., 2001; Transparency International, 
1996) and less governmental capture (Hellman, et. al., 2000).   These differences should produce 
stronger associations between large scale privatization and new firm growth in Poland than in 
Russia.   
Initial conditions are important factors in the development of the Polish de novo private 
sector.  Poland had a nascent small private sector and a varied mix of state-owned, collective and 
large domestic and foreign enterprises before the transition began.   The concentration of these 
enterprises varied substantially by region.  Given the importance of agglomeration, learning, and 
political effects the presence of a significant number of small private enterprises at the beginning 
of the transition gives a region a substantial advantage in expanding its de novo sector as the 
transition proceeds.   The presence of state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the transition is 
expected to depress the entrepreneurial process and therefore the growth and ultimately the size 
of the de novo sector.  These enterprises pay higher wages, thus raising the labor costs and 
reducing its supply for new enterprises, which will restrict their growth.  Even within the more 
benign Polish environment these firms are likely to be able to exert undue influence on a range of 
institutions from financial organizations to governments for preferential treatment and various 
subsidies, which again creates an unfavorable climate for enterprise creation.  Finally, there is 
empirical evidence from the U. S. and Poland that individuals residing in regions dominated by 
large organizations, which dominate the state-owned sector, independent of the size of their own 
employer, and employees in large organizations express less support for entrepreneurs and are 
less likely to say they would undertake entrepreneurial activity.  (Jackson and Rodkey, 1994 and 
                                                     
5 For the equation with new firms per capita we denominate the employment in small firms by 
population. 
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Jackson and Marcinkowski, 1999.)  All three factors lead us to expect a negative relationship 
between a region’s density of state-owned enterprises and the development of its de novo sector.  
These initial conditions will be relatively unimportant in explaining the development of the de 
novo sector in Russia as there was virtually no small private sector and all employment was in 
state firms at the beginning of the transition. 
A second assumption in our choice of instruments is that they are not systematically related to 
the change in income and in the income share of the bottom two quintiles after we control for new 
firm entry, lagged income or income shares and the other covariates.  In other words, their effect 
on income and income shares is only through their relationship with new firm creation and 
growth.  In order to empirically validate this identifying assumption we take two steps.  First in 
the estimating equation we control for the influence of initial income and income distribution.  
Initial conditions and early privatization are measured prior to our measure of initial income 
shares so that if these variables directly affect inequality their strongest effects should be on this 
variable and not on the subsequent change in income.   Second, we validate our exclusion 
restrictions by employing over-identification tests.  (See Hansen, 1982, and Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2003.)  These tests examine whether the identifying variables are individually or jointly 
correlated to the changes in income distribution conditional on firm entry and the other covariates 
in equation (1).  If we do not reject the null hypothesis of no correlation it provides some 
statistical confidence in our assumption.6 
Based on these propositions the first stage regression used to identify the impact of SMENT 
on ΔDIST is 
          110311 XCONDPRIVSMENT εδββα ++++=                                           (2) 
where PRIV denotes the privatization during 1990-93 for Poland and small and large 
privatization in 1993 for Russa and COND0, which applies only for Poland, is the 1990 
employment in small private and in state-owned firms.7 We therefore use the variables in PRIV 
and in COND0 as over-identifying restrictions when we estimate (1) for either Poland or Russia.  
We make one adjustment to the data before estimating eqs. 1 and 2.  The Warsaw region is 
dropped from the Polish sample and the Moscow from the Russian sample because they are 
extreme outliers whose inclusion exerts undue influence on the results.  (The dfits statistics for 
Warsaw and Moscow for each first stage estimation are about six times larger than both the next 
largest value and the conventional threshold for concluding that the observation may be 
problematic.) Both are capital cities with a very high proportion of government employees, whose 
wages are not determined by usual market forces but are more reflective of political interests.  
Both also dominated other regions in the amount of foreign investment, accounting for about half 
of all employment in new foreign owned firms, further skewing the income data.   
                                                     
6 As with all conventional statistical tests, not rejecting the null hypothesis does not mean we can 
accept it.  On the other hand, the higher the probability of getting our statistical results by chance 
under the null, the more likely the null is to be correct. 
7 The privatized employment in 1993 and the state-owned employment in 1990 are denominated 
by the non-farm workforce as we are using these variables to measure the concentration of 
industrial and commercial activity in these firms.  For the small private and de novo sector 
variables we are trying to assess the level of participation of the entire workforce in these 
enterprises.   
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Empirical Results – Income Distribution 
We begin with the relationships between new enterprise creation and changes in income 
distribution.  The full results for these estimations including detailed assessments of the quality of 
the instrumental variables is presented in Berkowitz and Jackson (2005).  Here we only present 
the results for the second stage estimations relating new enterprises to changes in the income 
share of the bottom two quintiles.  These results are shown in Table 3.  The top part of the table 
presents the results using the proportion of the workforce employed in new and/or small 
enterprises in 1997 and 2000 for Poland and Russia respectively.  The second part uses the 
change in this variable as the measure for new enterprise development while the last part uses the 
number of firms per hundred workers as the measure of the new economy. 
(Table 3 About Here.) 
Regardless of which measure is used and for both countries there is a strong and significant 
association between the growth of the de novo sector and the growth of the income share of the 
lowest two quintiles. The coefficients are not comparable because of the different ways that 
SMENT is measured, but in substantive terms each indicates substantial increase in income 
growth as de novo employment increases.  In Russia, a one standard deviation difference in each 
of the measures of new and small firm growth is associated with between a larger income share 
for the bottom forty percent of 1.4%, a 3.1% and a 3.2%  The smallest share growth is associated 
with the measure of new employment.  In Poland these one standard deviation differences are 
associated with a 1.4%, a 1.7% and  a 1.6% larger share for the first and second quintiles.  In both 
countries differences in the size and growth rate of the de novo sector have a large association 
with changes in income shares suggesting that it is the dynamics of this sector that are important 
in maintain income equality. 
The other variables suggest that changes in income shares are negatively related to the initial 
shares, to education levels and to populations.  Thus, in larger regions and in those with higher 
education levels the poor are likely to have become relatively worse off during the transition.  
Lastly, the Hansen J-statistics suggest it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation for changes in income shares.  In 
both countries the likelihood of getting this statistic by chance with no correlation is above 0.4.  
We do not report it here, but these instruments also have a very high partial association with the 
size and growth of the new and small enterprise sector, which is the other criteria for good 
instruments.   
Empirical Results – Income Growth 
The relations between the size and growth of the de novo sector and income growth offer an 
important compliment to the relations with income distribution.  Table 4 shows these relations for 
Poland and Table 5 for Russia.  The results for Russia are taken from Berkowitz and DeJong 
(2004) with minor changes to their specifications to make the models more similar to those in 
Poland.8   We also estimate an income growth equation for Russia for the period 1993 to 1997.  
                                                     
8 The biggest difference between the Polish and Russian models is that education is positiviely 
and significantly related to income growth in Poland but not in Russia.  It is still an important 
instrument for predicting new firm and new employment growth so it remains as an excluded 
instrument in the Russian analysis.  Berkowitz and DeJong also include a measure of initial local 
industrial potential, which is based on an industry’s labor share times its value added net of labor 
costs and summed for tradable industries.  It is meant to measure a region’s competitiveness on 
world markets prior to transition.  Otherwise the model is similar to the Polish model and to the 
model estimate for the change in income shares. 
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There is a legitimate concern that the income changes between 1993 and 2000 will be dominated 
by the 1998 crash, which could make any relationships very specific to that, we hope, unusual 
experience.   The 1993 to 1997 period was not one of robust growth but is more likely to be 
representative of transitions.   
(Tables 4 and 5 About Here.) 
In Poland and for both time periods in Russia regions with larger new and/or small enterprise 
sectors had significantly higher income growth rates.  The coefficients are not comparable 
because of the different ways that new enterprise development and income are measured in each 
country, but in substantive terms each indicates a substantial increase in income growth as the 
number of de novo firms and their employment increases.  In Russia, a one standard deviation 
difference in SMENT is associated with a 0.7%, a 1.9% or a 0.9%  higher annual growth rate 
between 1993 and 2000 depending upon which measure is used.  (The measure of the change in 
new sector employment implies the very large growth rate.)  For the 1993 to 1997 period in 
Russia the comparable changes in annual growth rates are 1.2% and 1.5% for employment share 
and numbers of firms respectively.  In Poland a one standard deviation increase in SMENT is 
associated with a between a 1.01% and a 1.11% higher annual growth rate between 1993 and 
1998.  These are substantial annual growth rates, which when compounded over five or more 
years imply a significantly increasing income gap between regions with successful new firm entry 
and growth and those regions without a robust new sector. 
The control variables function as expected.  In Poland education levels and population are 
positively associated with income growth. Interestingly, 1993 income levels are strongly 
negatively associated with income growth, indicating that previously better off regions had lower 
growth, unless they were able to stimulate new firm creation.  In Russia the initial industrial 
capacity and population are positively associated with income growth, though weakly so for 
population.   Initial income is essentially unrelated to income growth. The Hansen J-statistic 
testing the independence of the instruments from the stochastic term suggest we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of independence.  The lowest of the probabilities of getting the observed result by 
chance under this null is 0.19 and most probabilities are between 0.25 and 0.50.  These results 
offer some support for out effort to control for endogeneity through the instrumental variables.   
The results in Tables 3–5 make a strong case for the importance of new firm creation in 
developing an economic middle class.  In Poland and Russia, despite their very different 
transitions, higher rates of new firm entry and growth are positively associated with both income 
growth and the share of that income going to the lowest two quintiles.  Thus, contrary to some 
views that a successful transition hollows out the middle class we find that new firm growth is 
necessary for a successful transition and enhances the well-being of the middle class. 
4.  New Firm Creation and the Political Middle Class 
The political side of our proposition is that the successful new firms stimulate the growth of a 
liberal, centrist, political constituency that supports both economic and political reforms.  We 
have been referring to this constituency as a political middle class, which parallels our economic 
middle class.  In this section we summarize extensive data from various Polish studies on 
attitudes and elections and some findings from Russia to examine this proposition.  
Liberal Economic and Political Attitudes   
Our first proposition is that people employed in new enterprises are more likely to express 
liberal attitudes towards economic and political reforms.  Data from Poland and Russia are 
consistent with this proposition.  The Russian data are from extensive studies in 1993 and 1995 of 
a large set of attitudes reported in Zimmerman (2002).  We have extracted two questions from 
this survey.  The first asks if it a good idea for there to be competition among political parties and 
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the second if there should be competition between enterprises.  These go to the heart of both the 
liberal reforms.  Respondents are coded by type of enterprise where they work, with 7.0% and 
7.8% reporting they work in private or limited liability firms in 1993 and 1995 respectively.  
Responses to the two questions about competition are related to this measure of private work, and 
measures indicating that the person is not working (primarily student, housewife unemployed), is 
retired, is female, lives in a village, is a church attendee, the person’s education, income, and age.  
The Polish data are from the General Polish Social Survey conducted by the Institute of 
Social Studies at the University of Warsaw throughout the 1990’s (Cichomski and Morawski. 
1999) and the results here are from Jackson, et. al. 2005.9  The question on liberal economic 
attitudes is based on how much confidence respondents have in private relative to state owned 
firms.  High values indicate a great deal of confidence in private firms and hardly any confidence 
in state firms and low values just the opposite.  The question on politically liberal attitudes is 
respondents’ assessments of Communism as a form of government, with values ranging from a 
zero being a good form to one indicating it is a bad form.  Responses to these attitude questions 
are related to the same variables as in the Russian analysis plus whether the respondent is a 
private farmer, an employment category not present in Russia.  The Polish equations also include 
a variable measuring the amount of de novo employment as a proportion of the workforce for the 
region where the respondent lives.  An interesting comparison is that the proportion of the Polish 
respondents reporting they work in a private firm increases from 15.0% in 1992 to 26.7% in 
1997, which is much larger than the seven to eight percent of the Russian respondents who 
indicate they work in the private sector. 
Table 6 presents the estimated attitude models for both countries.  (Each equation includes a 
year dummy variable, which we omit here.)  In both countries and for both economic and political 
attitudes people working in private enterprises express more support for liberal outcomes than do 
those working in state enterprises or for the government itself.  (These latter two are the base 
categories.)  Interestingly, those who are not working express liberal attitudes similar to those of 
people employed in the private sector.  In Poland, where we have information on the size of the 
regional de novo economy, the results indicate that irrespective of where one works, residents in 
areas succeeding at developing their de novo economies express more support for private 
enterprises and less support for Communism than residents in regions that are lagging.   
(Table 6 About Here.) 
The other significant variables in both Russia and Poland are gender and a village residence, 
with women and villagers less likely than men or urban dwellers to express liberal attitudes; and 
education, with support for liberal economic and political attitudes increasing with years of 
schooling.  The notable differences between the two countries are the absence of any relationship 
between attitudes and age, income and church attendance in Russia while there are very strong 
relationships with these variables in Poland.  Among Poles, liberal attitudes increase with income 
and church attendance and decrease with age until about age fifty, at which point increasing age 
is associated with more liberal attitudes.  
Based on this evidence we feel modestly confident about the proposition that the growth of 
the de novo sector stimulates the growth of a set of citizens with liberal economic and political 
attitudes, both among its workers and in the regions where this sector is expanding.   
                                                     
9 We have reestimated their equations dropping variables with insignificant coefficients to present 
a more parsimonious model.  The coefficients on the private sector employment and regional new 
sector employment variables are unchanged.   
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Liberal Voting in Poland and Russia 
There have been extensive analyses of attitudes and voting patterns in Polish elections using 
both individual and aggregate data.  (See Fidrmuc, 2000a and 2000b; Jackson, Klich and 
Poznańska, 2005;  Jackson, Mach and Markowski, 20005; Mach and Jackson, 2005; Markowski, 
1999 and 2002; and Slomczynski, 2002,)   Unfortunately, there are fewer studies of Russian 
elections and only two that we know that includes information on de novo employment (Frye, 
2002 and 2005 and Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999).   One consistent result in both the individual 
and aggregate analyses is the association between being an owner or to a lesser extent an 
employee in a new firm or residing in an area with a high rate of new firm creation and voting for 
one of the  liberal parties.   The individual level analyses also show strong associations between 
the liberal attitudes just discussed and voting for liberal, pro-reform parties.   
Zimmerman (2002) shows that in the 1996 Russian presidential election whether one held 
economic and politically liberal attitudes very clearly separated Yeltsin voters form Ziuganov 
voters.  Over ninety percent of those with liberal attitudes (fifty-three percent of the voters) voted 
for Yeltsin while eighty-five percent of those with non-liberal attitudes voted for Ziuganov in 
1996.    Frye (2002 & 2005) shows that managers in newly formed enterprises have more liberal  
economic and political attitudes and are more likely to vote for liberal candidates than managers 
in the state firms and/or in state firms that were privatized. 
In Poland, Jackson, et. al. (2005) show strong associations between the economic and 
political attitudes just analyzed and voting in the 1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections and the 
1995 presidential election.  People with liberal attitudes are more likely to vote for the liberal 
Democratic Union in 1993, Wałęsa in 1995 and the Union of Freedom in 1997.  The liberal votes 
came at the expense of both the post-Communist parties, the SLD and the PSL and the far right 
and trade union parties.  The Polish far right and the trade union both espoused non-liberal 
economic policies, favoring more state control and subsidies for farmers and old industrial firms.  
Mach and Jackson (2005) take the argument one step further using a longitudinal data set.  Their 
evidence shows that respondents whose opinions became more liberal were likely to switch their 
votes to liberal parties and away from both the right and the left.  And, vice-versa for those whose 
attitudes had become less liberal. 
We finish the discussion with a presentation of the evidence from aggregate election data that 
liberal parties will have larger vote shares in regions with higher rates of new firm entry and 
growth, every thing else equal.  This evidence, coupled with the evidence about the relationships 
between attitudes favoring liberal policies and liberal voting, will be the strongest evidence about 
de novo economic activity and a rising political middle class.   
Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) in a study of internal goods prices in Russia separate regions 
based on how they voted in the two rounds of the 1996 Presidential election.  Those voting for 
Ziuganov in both rounds are labeled Red States, those voting for Yeltsin in both are Blue states 
(cross-national, cross-discipline consistency?) and the few that divided are Yellow.  The paper’s 
focus is not on correlates of voting, so they do not present a specified model relating vote shares 
for each candidate to de novo firm activity and other covariates.  They do, however, show 
descriptive statistics on the difference in enterprise start-ups per capita in Red and non-Red states.  
The difference is statistically significant, with non-Red states having a two-thirds higher rate of 
start-ups, 5.3 to 3.23 per capita.  For our purposes we can turn this association around to say that 
states with higher rates of startups are more likely to have voted for Yeltsin than Ziuganov.   
The evidence from Central Europe is much stronger as both Fidrmuc (2000a and 2000b) and 
Jackson, et. al. (2005) relate regional election returns to measures of the size of the regional  de 
novo economy, along with other covariates that help account for voting patterns.  Fidrmuc uses 
an admittedly weak measure of de novo activity in his analysis of voting in the Czech and Slovak 
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Republics, Hungary and Poland.10  The evidence generally shows a statistically significant and 
positive correlation between the amount of entrepreneurial activity and votes for the so-called 
reform parties and a negative association with votes for the left and the nationalist parties in these 
countries.  Across eight elections and multiple parties per election there are less than a handful of 
results that are inconsistent with his proposition.  Of these is for the MSzP party in Hungary in 
1994, which Grzymała-Busse (2002) characterizes as having become increasing liberal as it 
strived to be an electoral success.  Fidrmuc concludes by saying, “The winners, who form the 
pro-reform constituency, are the private entrepreneurs, urban residents, white-collar workers and 
highly educated voters..”  (Fidrmuc, 2000b, p. 13, emphasis his.)   
 Jackson, et. al. (2005) use a more inclusive and updated measure of regional de novo activity 
based on data filed with the Polish Central Statistical Office and integrated into a longitudinal file 
to track survival and employment growth in individual firms.  (These are the data used to analyze 
income distribution and growth in Poland.)  They show that for both the 1993 and 1997 
parliamentary elections that the amount of de novo employment in a region is negatively related 
to vote shares for both the post-Communist, left parties (the SLD and the PSL) and the trade 
union and far right parties (Solidarity and the KPN respectively in 1993 and the AWS and the 
ROP, respectively in 1997) while positively related to vote shares for the economically liberal 
UD and KLD in 1993 and the UW in 1997.  The extend the analysis to simulate vote and seat 
shares for counterfactual elections assuming fifty percent higher rates of de novo job creation.  In 
both elections, the centrist, liberal UD and UW would have gained a significant bloc of seats.   
Taken collectively, the voting evidence from the set of countries and early elections is that de 
novo activity is positively related to increasing vote shares for the centrist, liberal parties, and 
negatively related to shares for both left and far right parties.  We acknowledge the weaknesses of 
each specific regression equation, but feel this collective evidence provides strong and consistent 
support for the proposition that  an expanding de novo sector fully in private hands is a stimulant 
to the growth of a centrist, liberal political bloc, what we are calling the political middle class.  
5. Conclusions 
The success of a transition depends upon the development of a growing aggregate economy 
with an expanding middle class and a stable political structure with effective competition among 
contending parties.  The evidence from a number of studies cited here and from the analyses 
presented in out tables is that this economic growth and its more equitable distribution is 
dependent upon the growth of a privately owned, entrepreneurially based de novo sector.  
Countries where this activity is weak in the aggregate, such as much of Russia, are likely to have 
a very weak economic transition, despite enormous raw material resources.  By contrast, 
countries where this activity is strong, such as Poland and Hungary, are predicted to have a 
successful economic transition, despite the absence of natural wealth.   
On the political side, this private entrepreneurial activity is expected to stimulate the growth 
of a centrist bloc of voters, our so-called political middle class. Even when this bloc does not 
dominate in terms of absolute proportions of the electorate, the larger its size the more it shifts 
and concentrates the distribution of voters, often denoted by the median voter, in a more liberal 
direction.  This bloc is important directly as it is supports centrist liberal parties.  It is important 
                                                     
10 He uses the number of unincorporated entrepreneurs per capita, which misses the employment 
generated by de novo firms as well as the owners who incorporate their businesses.  The measure 
is also not updated to match the elections, as for example, the variable for the Polish elections is 
the same in 1997 as in 1993, yet we know the de novo sector was substantially larger in 1997 than 
in 1993. 
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beyond that, however, as it and the shifts in the aggregate electorate it produces puts constraints 
on the policies of parties further to the left and to the right, at least if these parties hope to obtain a 
substantial bloc of seats in parliament or run competitive presidential candidates.  For superb 
evidence on how post-Communist parties’ choices with respect to becoming more centrist 
affected their political success see Grzymała-Busse (2002) and Jackson, Mach and Markowski 
(2005).  We further contend that that this shift of voters towards the center and its electoral 
implications will be associated with the development of a more stable party structure and a more 
mature democracy, as measured by the ability to transfer power during post-election transitions. 
Without major disruptions. 11 One only needs to look at the transitional history in Hungary and 
Poland, where post-Communist governments succeeded the early reform governments only to be 
succeeded by governments led by reformers, without major disruptions to economic policy or to 
the efforts to meet the demands of joining the EU.   
 
                                                     
11 We want to make clear that our claim is that de novo economic activity and the emergence of 
this centrist bloc is important in developing a stable party structure, not that it is necessary and it 
surely not that it is sufficient. 
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Table 1: Income Distibution, Gini Coefficients 
Country 1987-89 1997-99 Change 
Czech Republic 0.20 0.26 +0.06 
Hungary 0.23 0.25 +0.02 
Poland 0.28 0.33 +0.05 
Slovakia 0.19 0.25 +0.06 
Slovenia 0.21 0.25 +0.04 
Central-East Europe Mean 0.25 0.30 +0.05 
Estonia 0.28 0.36 +0.08 
Russia 0.27 0.47 +0.20 
Ukraine 0.23 0.32 +0.09 
Belarus 0.23 0.24 +0.01 
Former CIS Mean 0.26 0.43 +0.17 
OECD Mean  0.31  
 
Data from UNICEF, 2001. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Measures of Changes in Income Distributions and Level 
Variable Russia: 1993-2000 a Poland: 1993-1998b 
Percent Change in Household Income   
Regional Mean -7.4% 34.5% 
Regional Median -7.7% 35.6% 
Regional St. Deviation 3.0% 24.4% 
Regional Minimum -14.6% -12.8% 
Regional Maximum 0.9% 94.8% 
Change in 1st and 2nd Quintile Income Shares Russia: 1995-2001 a Poland: 1993-1998b 
Regional Mean -1.0% 0.2% 
Regional Median -1.3% 0.3% 
Regional St. Deviation 2.5% 4.2% 
Regional Minimum -6.5% -9.7% 
Regional Maximum  5.2% 12.2% 
Employment in Small or New Firms/Workforce 2001 ∆’95-01 1997 ∆’93-97 
Regional Mean 7.6% -5.3% 11.0% 6.7% 
Regional Median 7.1% -5.5% 9.7% 5.8% 
Regional St. Deviation 3.4% 3.3% 4.7% 3.0% 
Regional Minimum 2.4% -14.8% 3.6% 2.0% 
Regional Maximum 26.4% 7.2% 23.0% 15.4% 
a.  Moscow region omitted from all statistics. 
b.  Warsaw region omitted from all statistics. 
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Table 3: Changes in Income Shares and the New Enterprise Sector 
 Russia: 1995-2001 Poland: 1993-1998 
Variable Coeff St. Err. Coeff St. Err. 
Distt-1 -0.79 0.08 -1.50 0.22 
New Emp /Work. 0.41 0.13 0.31 0.11 
Education -0.29 0.12 -1.35 0.77 
Log(Pop) -0.92 0.23 -1.01 0.45 
Constant 22.39 2.95 42.76 9.66 
R2 0.63  0.64  
Hansen J 0.05 0.83 a 1.50 0.47a 
Distt-1 -1.04 0.24 -1.50 0.23 
∆(New Emp/Work) 0.92 0.56 0.57 0.25 
Education -0.35 0.28 -1.36 0.80 
Log(Pop) -2.81 1.25 -1.32 0.58 
Constant 50.07 19.58 42.27 10.02 
R2 -0.09  0.63  
Hansen J 0.13 0.72 a 1.60 0.45 a 
Distt-1 -0.83 0.13 -1.50 0.21 
New Firms/Pop 1.84 0.96 2.00 0.79 
Education -0.88 0.51 -1.46 0.85 
Log(Pop) -1.22 0.60 -1.14 0.54 
Constant 31.84 10.12 43.35 10.24 
R2 0.21  0.63  
Hansen J 0.01 0.92 a 1.83 0.40 a 
 a. Probability of getting this statistic by chance if instruments are independent of εt.




Table 4:  New Firm Creation and Annual Income Growth Rates in Poland, 1993 – 1998a 
 New Emp /Workforce ∆(New Emp/Workforce) New Firms/(Pop/100) 
Variable Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err 
Log(Inct-1) -0.260 0.028 -0.258 0.032 -0.258 0.031 
De Novo Sector 0.213 0.080 0.369 0.183 1.420 0.647 
Education 0.023 0.004 0.023 0.005 0.022 0.005 
Log(Population) 0.019 0.004 0.018 0.005 0.018 0.005 
Constant -0.527 0.053 -0.529 0.058 -0.519 0.052 
R2 0.73  0.68  0.70  
Hansen J 3.32 0.19 b 2.78 0.25 b 2.06 0.36b 
a.  Left-hand side variable is log(Mean Income98/Mean Income93) 
b.  Probability of getting this statistic by chance if instruments are independent of εt. 
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Table 5:  New Firm Creation and Annual Income Growth Rates in Russiaa 
 1993 - 2000 
 (New Emp /Workforce)2000 ∆(New Emp/Work.) 2000 New Firms/(Pop/100) 2000 
Variable Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err 
Log(Inct-1) -0.007 0.018 -0.008 0.023 -0.006 0.017 
De Novo Sector 0.202 0.122 0.562 0.280 0.515 0.205 
Indust Capacity 0.044 0.025 0.033 0.027 0.046 0.027 
Log(Population) 0.010 0.006 -0.001 0.010 0.009 0.006 
Constant -0.151 0.060 -0.025 0.113 -0.148 0.061 
R2 0.11  -0.19  0.13  
Hansen J 2.78 0.25 b 1.45 0.48 b 1.65 0.44b 
 1993 - 19997 
 (New Emp /Workforce)1997  New Firms/(Work/100) 1997 
Variable Coeff St. Err   Coeff St. Err 
Log(Inct-1) 0.009 0.017   0.001 0.018 
De Novo Sector 0.364 0.189   0.881 0.381 
Indust Capacity 0.044 0.038   0.049 0.034 
Log(Population) 0.011 0.007   0.012 0.007 
Constant -0.124 0.055   -0.114 0.054 
R2 0.15    0.22  
Hansen J 1.21 0.55 b   0.38 0.83b 
a.  Left-hand side variable is log(Real per capital incomet/Real per capita income93) 
b.  Probability of getting this statistic by chance if instruments are independent of εt. 
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Table 6:  Attitudes Towards Liberal Economic and Political Issues 
 Russia Poland 
Variable Economic Political Economic Political 
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